@article{10.1145/3637063,
author = {Liao, Qianru and Huang, Yongzhi and Huang, Yandao and Wu, Kaishun},
title = {An Eavesdropping System Based on Magnetic Side-Channel Signals Leaked by Speakers},
year = {2023},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
issn = {1550-4859},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3637063},
doi = {10.1145/3637063},
abstract = {The use of speakers in electronic devices has become widespread, but the security risks associated with micro-speakers, such as earphones, are often overlooked. Many assume that soundproof barriers can prevent sound leakage and protect privacy. This paper presents the prototype MagEar, an eavesdropping system that exploits magnetic side-channel signals leaked by a micro-speaker to restore intelligible human speech. MagEar outperforms some high-precision magnetometers in detecting magnetic fields at the nanotesla level. Even at a distance of 60 cm, it can recover high-quality audio with a 90\% similarity to the original audio. Moreover, the MagEar prototype is portable and can be concealed within a headset housing. We have implemented MagEar as a proof-of-concept system and conducted multiple case studies on the eavesdropping of various speaker-embedded devices, including earphones. The recovered speech can be transcribed using automatic speech recognition techniques, even when obstructed by soundproof walls. It is our aspiration that our work can prompt manufacturers to reconsider the security vulnerabilities of speakers.},
note = {Just Accepted},
journal = {ACM Trans. Sen. Netw.},
month = {dec},
keywords = {Privacy disclosure, Side Channel attack, Mobile security, Eavesdropping, Magnetic field}
}